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BEYOND A ZERO-SUM FEDERAL TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY:
LESSONS FROM FEDERAL INDIAN
ENERGY POLICY
Monte Mills*
ABSTRACT
The federal government’s trust relationship with federallyrecognized Indian tribes is a product of the last two centuries of
Federal Indian Law and federal-tribal relations. For approximately
the last 50 years, the federal government has sought to promote
tribal self-determination as a means to carry out its trust
responsibilities to Indian tribes; but the shadows of prior federal
policies, based largely on notions of tribal incompetence and federal
paternalism, remain. Perhaps no other policy arena better
demonstrates the history, evolution, and promise for reform of the
federal trust relationship than Federal Indian energy policy, or the
range of federal statutes and regulations devoted to the management
of the development of tribal energy resources. This article provides
a detailed review of Federal Indian energy policy and proposes a
new path for reform that would allow for broader tribal authority
and, potentially, a new conception of the federal trust responsibility.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between Indian tribes, the federal
government, and the development, transportation, and use of energy
resources is fraught with conflict, opportunity, and challenge. While
the world has recently learned of these conflicts through tribal
*

Assistant Professor and Co-Director, Margery Hunter Brown Indian Law
Clinic at the Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana.
Thanks to Professor Kevin Washburn, Professor Ezra Rosser, and Professor
Michelle Bryan for their thoughtful and immensely helpful comments on drafts
of this article. Also, special thanks to those who reviewed and commented on a
draft of this article as part of the inaugural Natural Resources Law Teachers
Workshop hosted by the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation at the
Foundation’s 63rd Annual Institute. Finally, thanks to Summer Carmack, who
provided thoughtful and much-needed research assistance. The views expressed
herein—and any errors made in doing so—are mine alone.
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opposition to massive oil pipeline projects permitted to cross
historical tribal treaty lands, such as the Dakota Access and
Keystone XL,1 the economic potential of energy development
within Indian Country has long been the subject of significant tribal
and federal attention. A century and a quarter after the first federal
law authorizing the leasing and development of tribal energy
resources,2 there is now a comprehensive body of federal laws,
regulations, and policies that apply to the development of both
“traditional” and renewable energy resources within Indian
Country.3 Taken together, these laws, regulations, and policies form
a broad Federal Indian energy policy that is bound up in the history
of federal oversight of tribal resources and, more recently, attempts
to promote tribal self-determination and economic development.4
Federal Indian energy policy reflects the balance of tribal
sovereignty and the federal role in overseeing tribal resources at the
heart of Federal Indian law.5 For example, since the enactment of
the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act (IMLA),6 the federal
government has promoted natural resource development as a way to
serve the twin aims of enhancing tribal sovereignty and economic
prosperity—two objectives that were hallmarks of the Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA) passed just a few years earlier.7 Nearly
50 years later, in the early years of the current era of tribal self1

See, e.g., Jack Healy, Tension on the Plains as Tribes Move to Block a
Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2016, at A9 https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/08/24/us/occupying-the-prairie-tensions-rise-as-tribes-move-to-blocka-pipeline.html [https://perma.cc/UYD3-K8LP] (last visited Dec. 5, 2017)
(includes a photo depicting “Lakota riders” demonstrating against the Dakota
Access Pipeline).
2
Act of February 28, 1891, Ch. 383, 26 Stat. 794, 51st Cong. (1891).
3
See, e.g., Indian Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2012); Indian
Mineral Development Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012); Indian Tribal
Energy Development & Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3506 (2012); Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012).
4
See Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Cnty.: The Evolution of
Tribal Control over Mineral Res., 29 TULSA L.J. 541 (1994). Article provides a
comprehensive review of the evolution of tribal authority over mineral
development under Federal Indian energy policy.
5
Professor Royster has aptly described the evolution of the federal-tribal
relationship under various mineral development statutes as a “microcosm of the
history of federal-tribal relations during the last century.” Id. at 543.
6
Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, Ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a–396g (2012)).
7
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 416 et seq. (2012) (editorially reclassified as 25 U.S.C.
§§ 5101–5144)).
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determination, a coalition of energy-focused tribes pushed for the
Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA),8 which authorized more
tribal independence in the negotiation and development of energy
deals. More recent enactments and corresponding regulations have
authorized even greater tribal authority over the leasing of surface
lands for the development of solar and wind energy projects.9 And
yet, notwithstanding these efforts to encourage greater tribal
authority, tribes seeking to capitalize from energy development still
face delays and obstacles resulting from the federal government’s
involvement.10 As a result, “energy tribes” continue to advocate for
even further loosening, if not eliminating, the federal role in tribal
energy development.11 These efforts align with and may find
support from recent policies of President Donald J. Trump and
Secretary of the Interior, Ryan Zinke, to promote domestic energy
production and remove the federal government from development
decisions.12
Meanwhile, other tribes and tribal citizens remain concerned
about the inability or unwillingness of federal or tribal governments
to prevent energy development-related environmental harm to their
tribal homelands and resources.13 The gathering of thousands of
8

Indian Mineral Development Act, Pub. L. No. 97-382, 96 Stat. 1938 (1982)
(codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2108 (2012)).
9
Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act, 25
U.S.C. § 415(h) (2012); Leases & Permits, 25 C.F.R. Pt. 162 (2012).
10
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-502, Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Indian Affairs, U.S. Senate: Indian Energy Dev.: Poor Mgmt. by
BIA has Hindered Energy Dev.on Indian Lands (June 2015),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670701.pdf [https://perma.cc/7K2C-9KNS]
[hereinafter GAO-15-502]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-43,
Indian Energy Dev.: Additional Actions by Fed. Agencies are Needed to
Overcome Factors Hindering Dev. (Nov. 2016), https://www.gao.
gov/assets/690/680935.pdf [https://perma.cc/K78A-H4L7] [hereinafter GAO17-43].
11
See, e.g., GAO-15-502, supra note 10, at 25–26; Indian Tribal Energy
Development & Self-Determination Act Amendments of 2014: Hearing on S.
2132 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014).
12
See Promoting Energy Independence & Economic Growth, Exec. Order No.
13,783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (March 28, 2017); Mark Wolf, Interior Sec’y
Pledges Advocacy for Tribes, THE NCSL BLOG, May 2, 2017, http://www.ncsl.
org/blog/2017/05/02/interior-secretary-pledges-advocacy-for-tribes.aspx [https:
//perma.cc/JKB9-C2W8]; Oversight hearing on ‘Identifying Indian Affairs
Priorities for the Trump Admin.,” SENATE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, March 8,
2017, https://www.indian.senate.gov/hearing/oversight-hearing-identifyingindian-affairs-priorities-trump-administration1 [https://perma.cc/2878-NNA2].
13
See, e.g.,; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Pawnee Nation & Walter Echo-Hawk Sue
over Fracking, TURTLETALK, Nov. 21, 2016,
https://turtletalk.wordpress.com/2016/11/21/pawnee-nation-walter-echo-hawk-
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tribal and non-tribal citizens in opposition to the Dakota Access
Pipeline in North Dakota powerfully demonstrated the coalescence
of broader concerns over climate change, environmental damage,
and these tribal issues.14 Though the core of those challenges was
rooted in the connection of the Sioux nation to the land and water,
the water protectors also stood in opposition to development of
fossil fuels and energy projects more broadly.15 Those concerns
reflected a deeper division within Indian Country, aptly summed up
by Professor Matthew Fletcher’s recent comments that, because
“most Indian tribes are not energy tribes, and most Indian people are
not supportive of natural resources extraction,” the continued push
to allow greater tribal authority over energy development may result
in “a terrible battle over competing claims to tribal sovereignty—
tribal energy against tribal environments.”16 Thus, while historically
focused on promoting the development of tribal energy resources,
Federal Indian energy policy now affects a diverse array of tribal
interests, and even when an energy tribe may benefit from a shift in
that policy toward that tribe’s priorities, such reform may impact
other tribes.17
sue-over-fracking/ [https://perma.cc/MW9S-THS7]; Sulome Anderson, What
Oil Pipelines can do to Native Am. Land & Life, VICE MEDIA, Nov. 28, 2016,
7:30am, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/standing-rock-fort-berthold-howoil-can-transform-and-damage-native-reservations [https://perma.cc/WBV9ANWB].
14
See, e.g., Jason Patinkin, Standing Rock Tribe Protests over N. Dakota
Pipeline, AL JAZEERA MEDIA NETWORK, Oct. 29, 2016, 12:18 GMT, http:
//www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/10/north-dakota-nativeamericans-protest-pipeline-161028150518748.html [https://perma.cc/V6SDJ4YY]; Eugene Tapahe, Injustice at Standing Rock, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov.
22, 2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/injustice-at-standingrock_us_58337cf6e4b0d28e5521542c [https://perma.cc/2FDX-SQBM]; Stand
with Standing Rock: News, STAND WITH STANDING ROCK, http:
//standwithstandingrock.net/category/news/ [https://perma.cc/Y6YM-EKR3]
(last visited Dec. 5, 2017).
15
See, e.g., Kyle Powys White, Why the Native Am. pipeline resistance in N.
Dakota is about Climate Justice, THE CONVERSATION, Sept. 16, 2016, 12:28 PM
EDT, https://theconversation.com/why-the-native-american-pipeline-resistancein-north-dakota-is-about-climate-justice-64714 [https://perma.
cc/4N48-KZ8H].
16
Matthew Fletcher, New Divisions in Indian Cnty. over Energy Justice,
TURTLETALK, May 2, 2017, 11:35 EDT, https://turtletalk.wordpress.
com/2017/05/02/fletcher-new-divisions-in-indian-country-over-energy-justice/
[https://perma.cc/D537-5RQF].
17
One example is the conflicting interests of the Crow Nation, who seeks to
produce coal to ship to Asian markets through territory in which other tribes of
the Northwest have reserved treaty rights. See, e.g., William Yardley, U.S.
Rejects Proposed Coal Export Facility, Siding with One Indian Tribe Over
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If the prospect of an impending conflict between tribal
energy development and tribal environmental concerns is realistic,
then the federal government’s role in Federal Indian energy policy
cannot continue to ignore the environmental, social, natural, and
cultural well-being of tribes and their members. Integrating multiple
and sometimes conflicting values into the development of energy
policy is already a significant challenge,18 which, when it comes to
Federal Indian energy policy, is compounded by the historical
narrowness of that policy.
Just as the various eras of Federal Indian energy policy
reflect the eras of broader Federal Indian policy, the federal-tribal
relationship dictated by Federal Indian energy policy reflects the
broader federal trust relationship with Indian tribes. While the
federal-tribal relationship with regard to energy development has
evolved over time, it has always moved along a single axis, with
broad, paternalistic oversight and control by the federal government
at one end and tribal self-determination and sovereignty at the
other.19 Though the federal policy has shifted along this axis toward
allowing greater tribal authority, the limits of the discussion have
always been clear: tribes can assume greater authority but only to
the extent that such assumption correspondingly reduces federal
obligations. In addition, tribes are limited to exercising expanded
authority in a manner consistent with the federal government’s
existing standards and practices.20 In other words, for tribes, Federal
Indian energy policy is a zero-sum proposition where the only

Another, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2016, 8:01 PM) http://www.latimes.com/nation/lana-sej-cherry-point-20160509-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/8MZ5-KFKM].
18
See, e.g., Victor Flatt & Heather Payne, Not One Without the Other: The
Challenge of Integrating U.S. Env’t, Energy, Climate, & Econ. Policy, 44
ENVT’L. L. 1079, 1081 (2014) (“Our energy laws and policies focus on national
security, cheap energy, or energy that causes less environmental harm, but these
interests may work at cross purposes.”).
19
Professor Ezra Rosser describes a similar “trade-off,” between the trust
responsibility and tribal self-determination. Ezra Rosser, The Trade-Off Between
Self-Determination & the Trust Doctrine: Tribal Gov’t & the Possibility of
Failure, 58 ARK. L. REV. 291, 350–51 (2005). See also Carla F. Fredericks,
Plenary Energy, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 789, 790–91 (2015).
20
See, e.g., Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership
Act (HEARTH Act), 25 U.S.C. §§ 415(h)(3)(B)(i)–(ii) (2012); Indian Tribal
Energy Development & Self-Determination Act of 2005, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–
3506, 3504(e)(2)(C) (2012); 25 C.F.R. 224.63(c) (2014).
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variables considered are whether and to what extent the tribe decides
to assume the pre-existing federal role.21
The evolution of the federal trust responsibility, particularly
in the current era of tribal self-determination, has exposed these
limits in clear relief. Professor Kevin Washburn, who served as
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs at the United States
Department of Interior (the Department)—the federal official most
responsible for carrying out the trust responsibility—from 20122015, recently explained that increased tribal self-determination
means that “tribal decisions have begun to have more significant
consequences, and have produced confusion about federal and tribal
roles and responsibilities.”22 In addition, Professor Washburn notes
that “the residue of federal paternalism continues to pose significant
obstacles for tribes,”23 while, in the name of promoting tribal selfgovernment, both the judicial24 and legislative25 branches have
significantly narrowed the federal government’s potential liability
for breaches of its trust oversight and approval duties.26 In light of
this conflict, Professor Washburn poses the “significant question
[of] whether the trust responsibility has any value to tribes if tribes
are subject to federal control for which the federal government is not
legally accountable.”27 Professor Washburn ultimately concludes
that the political branches have become largely responsible for
fulfilling the trust responsibility,28 which now, “in effect, constitutes
the obligation to foster and protect tribal self-governance.”29
21

Cf. Raymond Cross, The Fed. Trust Duty in an Age of Indian SelfDetermination: An Epitaph for a Dying Doctrine?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 369, 394
(describing the United States Supreme Court’s zero sum approach toward the
federal trust responsibility and tribal sovereignty in United States v. Navajo
Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003)); Rosser, supra note 19, at 311–20. See also
GOKTUG MORCOL, A COMPLEXITY THEORY FOR PUBLIC POLICY 50–55 (2012).
22
Kevin K. Washburn, What the Future Holds: The Changing Landscape of
Fed. Indian Policy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 200, 202 (2017).
23
Id. at 223.
24
See, e.g., United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 301–02 (2009);
United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 173–79 (2011).
25
See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2103(e) (excusing the United States from any liability or
losses suffered by an Indian tribe pursuant to an IMDA approved by the
Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the terms of that Act and applicable
law).
26
See Washburn, supra note 22, at 208–12 (reviewing the Supreme Court’s
Indian trust jurisprudence and concluding that it “seems that the trust
responsibility exists, but only in situations in which tribal self-determination
does not . . . Power, it is sometimes said, is a zero-sum game.”).
27
Washburn, supra note 22, at 212.
28
Washburn, supra note 22, at 200.
29
Washburn, supra note 22, at 214.
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Like Professor Washburn, Kevin Gover, another former
Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs, analyzed the federal-tribal
relationship after his 2001 departure from the Department of
Interior.30 In an article published five years later, Gover called for
bringing the trust relationship into the 21st century by criticizing
federal policy at the time as “stirringly dumb”31 and arguing that,
because “[t]he assumptions [of tribal incompetence and
impermanence] underlying the trust are invalid…the specifics of the
trust hold little value in the making of modern Indian policy.”32
Instead, Gover proposed that “Tribes should be able to retain those
aspects of the trust that they find useful and desirable and eliminate
those that they do not want.”33 Citing to a pre-cursor of 2012’s
Helping Expedite Affordable and Responsible Tribal
Homeownership (HEARTH) Act,34 as a key step toward his
proposal, Gover’s modern trust would allow for negotiation, on a
tribe-by-tribe basis, of the trust duties to be carried out by the federal
government.35
As two of the top-three longest serving Assistant Secretaries
for Indian Affairs, Washburn and Gover offer deeply informed and
critical views that, taken together, can help chart a course for the
next era of federal Indian policy, albeit with some significant
potential challenges.36 Perhaps more than any other policy area,
Federal Indian energy policy provides a concrete context that
demonstrates the shortcomings of continuing the zero-sum approach
to balancing the federal trust responsibility with tribal selfgovernance. Importantly, however, recent developments within this
policy arena also show the potential for moving beyond that single
axis of federal-tribal relations toward a new relationship that would
30

See generally Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46
NAT. RES. J. 317 (2006).
31
Id. at 373.
32
Id. at 318.
33
Id. at 359.
34
Navajo Nation Trust Land Leasing Act of 2000, S. Con. Res. 161, 114 Stat.
3211 (2000). In 2012, the HEARTH Act further amended the Indian Long-Term
Leasing Act to allow other tribes to assume control of surface leasing, subject to
relevant limitations. See infra Part II, Section G (Helping Expedite Affordable
and Responsible Tribal Homeownership Act (HEARTH) of 2012).
35
Gover supra note 30, at 359–62.
36
For example, both Washburn recognizes the increased scrutiny of tribal
decision-making and calls for additional federal oversight to prevent human
rights or other perceived abuses. See Washburn supra note 22 at 224–31. Both
Washburn and Gover note the need to protect allottees and their interests. See id.
at 230–31; Gover supra note 30, at 367–68.

42

allow for broader and more independent tribal authority without a
corresponding reduction of federal support or involvement.
Therefore, while there remains a real potential for the battle of
“tribal energy against tribal environments,”37 all tribes, whether
energy- or environmentally-focused, stand to benefit from a
potentially redefined federal-tribal relationship.
This article highlights the lessons of Federal Indian energy
policy to demonstrate how the evolution and future of that policy
may result in a new federal-tribal relationship; one that moves
beyond the limits of the zero-sum approach. To do so, the article
begins by setting the historical context of Federal Indian energy
policy, including its basis in the federal trust relationship and its
development through various eras of broader Federal Indian Law
and policy. The second part details the current century’s
contributions to Federal Indian energy policy: the 2005 Indian
Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
(ITEDSDA),38 which authorized tribal authority over a variety of
energy-related transactions, and the HEARTH Act,39 which, in
combination with revised leasing regulations specifically providing
for wind and solar projects,40 authorized greater tribal authority over
certain energy-related surface leases. The article then proceeds to
critique each of these approaches, as well as the most recent
legislative and administrative reform proposals, in light of their
continuing promotion of a zero-sum strategy. After acknowledging
the current threats to an expanded approach to Federal Indian energy
policy, the article proposes a new, more holistic approach to reform
to meet the challenges left unaddressed by current law and recent
proposals for change. The article then concludes with a few
examples of the beginning of such an approach as well as its
potential applicability beyond the realm of Federal Indian energy
policy.
Ultimately, although recognizing that the current political
climate poses significant threats to tribes and tribal authority, this
article concludes on a hopeful note. The potential for meaningful
37

Fletcher, supra note 16.
Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 764 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 3501–06 (2012)).
39
Helping Expedite & Advance Responsible Tribal Home Ownership Act of
2012, Pub. L. No. 112-151, 126 Stat. 1150 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
415(h)(2012)).
40
See generally 25 C.F.R. §§ 162.501–599 (2014).
38
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reform of the federal-tribal relationship, led by tribal initiative and
implemented in accordance with tribal priorities, is real; and, just as
the long arc of history bends toward justice,41 the arc of the federaltribal trust relationship bends toward such tribally-driven reform.
II.

HOW WE GOT HERE: THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP
AND FEDERAL INDIAN ENERGY POLICY

The federal trust relationship with Indian tribes is a complex,
broad, and multi-faceted beast; however, energy and mineral
development in Indian Country presents perhaps the clearest
window into the evolution of that relationship. Indeed, the federal
approach to such development has consistently reflected the
prevailing federal policy toward Indian tribes, for better or worse,
and, more recently, provided a vehicle for the Supreme Court to
significantly limit the potential for tribes to enforce the trust
responsibility by pursuing damages claims against the federal
government.42 As such, this section provides a detailed overview of
the history of the nature of the trust responsibility and its role in
Federal Indian energy policy.
A. The Trust Relationship
The roots of the federal government’s trust responsibility to
Indian tribes are entwined with those of the United States itself.
Although it was not until 1831 that Chief Justice John Marshall
described the relationship of the federal government to an Indian
nation as “that of a ward to his guardian,” he rested that assertion
upon earlier treaties and other relations with the tribes that, in
Marshall’s view, informed the drafters of the Constitution to include
41

THEODORE PARKER, TEN SERMONS OF RELIGION 84–85 (Frances Power Cobbe
ed., 1853); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at the Conclusion of the Selma
to Montgomery March, STANFORD UNIVERSITY (March 25, 1965), http:
//kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/documentsentry/doc_address_at_t
he_conclusion_of_selma_march.1.html [https://perma.cc/82GA-FQ6X].
42
United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 513 (2003) (Navajo I) (“[T]he
Tribe’s assertions are not grounded in a specific statutory or regulatory
provision that can fairly be interpreted as mandating money damages.”); United
States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287, 301-02 (2009) (Navajo II) (“Because the
Tribe cannot identify a specific, applicable, trust-creating statute or regulation
that the Government violated, we do not reach the question whether the trust
duty was money mandating.”); See infra notes 89–93 (providing the original
features of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938).
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“Indian tribes” as entities distinct from states and foreign nations
with which Congress was authorized to regulate commerce.43 In the
following term of the Supreme Court, Marshall further defined the
federal-tribal relationship to the exclusion of the state authority and
again relied upon treaties between the tribes and the United States
for support of his finding that “[t]he whole intercourse between the
United States and the [Indian] nation[s], is, by our constitution and
laws, vested in the government of the United States.”44 In addition,
Marshall drew upon the colonial history of the United States and
recognized that, by entering treaties with the original inhabitants of
the nation, the United States, as had colonial powers before it,
acknowledged the tribes’ right of self-governance and assumed the
burdens of “furnish[ing] supplies of which they were in absolute
need, and restrain[ing] dangerous intruders from entering their
country.”45 Beyond the treaties, Marshall noted this recognition was
also reflected in the earliest laws of both the Continental and United
States Congresses.46 Thus, as conceived by Marshall, the trust
relationship flowed from the United States’ colonial ancestry and its
subsequent assumption of the role of protector of the tribes in the
nation’s earliest treaties and laws.47
The manner in which Congress first sought to regulate trade
and intercourse between Indians and non-Indian settlers remains
relevant for present-day Federal Indian energy policy. The first socalled Trade and Intercourse Act, enacted in 1790, required that any
sale of Indian property be done only pursuant to the authority of the
United States.48 Congress also created a substantial role for the
federal government in the regulation and licensing of those trading
with Indians.49 These oversight and approval activities were
consistent with duties that the United States had assumed under
43

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1831); U.S. CONST. ART. I, §
8, cl. 3.
44
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 520 (1832).
45
Id. at 547; see id. at 561.
46
Id. at 549, 556–57; 2 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 175, 183 (1775); Act of Aug. 7,
1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 49. See also Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63
DUKE L. J. 999, 1007–08 (2014). Four of the nation’s first thirteen statutes dealt
with Indian affairs. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FED. INDIAN LAW § 1.03 (Nell
Jessup Newton, ed. 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK].
47
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557–58.
48
Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138. (confirmed by Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 534, 568–69 (1823)). This provision remains in effect, with
some revisions. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (2012).
49
Act of July 22, 1790, §§ 1–3.

45

earlier treaties with various tribes and were the practical exercise of
Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate commerce with Indian
tribes.50 Chief Justice Marshall later conceptualized (and sought to
justify) the United States’ interest in Indian lands as “absolute
ultimate title … acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian
title of occupancy.”51 This conception, in combination with Chief
Justice Marshall’s subsequent “ward to guardian” notion, ultimately
led to the Congressional recognition that the federal government
holds Indian lands in trust for the benefit of tribes and, in the case of
allotted lands, for individual Indians.52
The federal trust responsibility and the concomitant federal
trusteeship of a tribal property is thus a fundamental tenet of both
federal Indian law and our nation’s constitutional structure. It is no
surprise, then, that the United States’ approach to the development
of tribal energy and mineral resources has depended upon how both
the legislative and executive branches sought to carry out these
responsibilities.
B. The Early Years: What Policy?
The first efforts to authorize the leasing of Indian lands for
mining purposes arose in the early years of the allotment era.
Congress opened that era and the subsequent rush on Indian lands
by authorizing the allotment of Indian reservations pursuant to the
Dawes Act of 1887.53 Contemporaneously with the push to open
Indian reservations for allotment, other private interests sought to
lease Indian lands for grazing and mining; however, questions soon
arose as to whether Indians could lease their lands without federal
approval.54 The Attorney General and the Department of the Interior
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repeatedly concluded that federal approval was required for such
transactions; and because no federal law authorized such approvals,
any such leases were void.55 Frustration over the limitations on the
alienability of Indian land largely motivated the first legislative
effort to allow leasing of such land, which came about via an
amendment to the Dawes Act passed in 1891.56
The 1891 Act authorized the leasing of individual allotments
where the allottee “by reason of age or other disability … can not
personally and with benefit to himself occupy or improve his
allotment.”57 The act also authorized the leasing of lands “occupied
by Indians who have bought and paid for the same … by authority
of the Council speaking for such Indians.”58 The phrase “bought and
paid for” initially caused some confusion because neither tribes nor
allottees had paid for their lands. Nonetheless, the Department of the
Interior concluded that the 1891 Act applied to lands reserved by a
tribe where the tribe had ceded other lands to the federal
government.59
Additionally, the 1891 Act cured the prior lack of federal
involvement by expressly requiring the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior for each lease and by authorizing the Secretary to
prescribe the terms and conditions for allotment leases and the
“agent in charge” of a reservation to recommend the terms and
conditions for all other leases.60 According to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs, however, the leases themselves were negotiated
between the Indians and the companies seeking the lease, thereby
affording tribal consent, and the federal role was limited to
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permitting the negotiations and approving the final product.61 This
limited federal role, the tribal consent requirement, and the broad
interpretation of the applicability of the 1891 Act caused
consternation in Congress over the potential for tribes to lease their
mineral resources without benefit to the federal government.62
As the “mighty pulverizing engine” of allotment rolled on,
tribes lost extensive ownership and control over their lands and
resources.63 The Supreme Court’s 1903 decision in Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock encouraged these efforts by throwing open reservations
upon a Congressional whim, regardless of whether any treaty
required tribal consent for such action and with a presumption that
Congress’ action would be in “perfect good faith.”64 The allotment
and subsequent opening of “surplus lands” within Indian
reservations to settlement by non-Indians generally resulted in the
alienation of subsurface minerals and resources as well, unless
Congress specifically reserved the subsurface estate to the tribe or
otherwise.65 In the early 1900s, growing concern over the loss of
significant mineral resources to private ownership motivated the
61
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United States to reserve coal from the patenting of homesteads on
public lands.66 Similar sentiments eventually resulted in the splitting
of the surface and subsurface estates for allotments and other lands
within Indian Country that had been opened to entry.67
In 1919, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to
lease unallotted Indian lands in nine western states for the mining of
metalliferous minerals.68 These provisions allowed the Secretary to
open such lands for the location of mining claims and then, upon
such location, lease the lands for a twenty-year period and include a
preferential right to renew for subsequent ten year periods.69 Perhaps
reflecting earlier concerns over the tribal consent requirement of the
1891 Act, the 1919 leasing authorization did not require any tribal
consent for such leases, although it did require that the royalties paid
(not less than five percent of net value) be held by the United States
for the credit of the tribe whose lands were leased.70 Congress also
expressly disclaimed any federal interference with the rights of
states to tax the “rights, property, or assets of any lessee.”71 Seven
years later, Congress expanded this leasing authority to include
“nonmetalliferous minerals, not including oil and gas.”72
In 1924, Congress expanded the reach of the 1891 leasing
provisions to include oil and gas leasing for most reservations
authorized by treaty or agreement.73 The 1924 Act maintained the
earlier act’s requirement of tribal consent and established lease
terms of ten years “and as much longer thereafter as oil or gas shall
be found in paying quantities.”74 In addition, however, Congress
66
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specifically authorized state taxation of revenues produced from
such leases and directed the Secretary of the Interior to pay such
taxes from the royalties generated by the leases.75 These provisions
were subsequently extended to reservations created by executive
order.76
The allotment period, therefore, generated varied and
conflicting statutory approaches to the development of the mineral
and energy resources of Indian lands. The applicable statutory
structure depended upon the type of mineral resource sought and the
reservation where it was located. Depending on those factors, the
process for securing a lease to develop such resources may or may
not require tribal consent, state taxes may or may not be applicable,
and the terms of each such lease may vary. Across the board,
however, the various enactments generally tracked broader federal
interests (i.e., protection of minerals for national benefit, opening
lands to non-Indian settlement) without significant consideration of
tribal objectives, including environmental or cultural concerns.
Although some tribes were more actively engaged in negotiation
and granting of their consent for leasing, at least where such consent
was required, few had the information, expertise, or experience to
effectively leverage such consent and assert greater influence on
their federal trustee.77 Instead, consistent with the Supreme Court’s
view of plenary federal power in Lone Wolf, leasing and
development of Indian lands for energy and mineral purposes during
the allotment era—at least on those Indian lands that were not lost
during the era—was subject to Congressional whim and dominated
by federal, not tribal, priorities.78 In the late 1920s and early 1930s,
however, these priorities began to shift, and the result would define
the development of Indian mineral resources for much of the rest of
the 20th century.
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C. Reorganizing Federal Indian Energy Policy
The allotment and assimilation policies of the late 19th and
early 20th centuries had drastic effects across Indian Country and,
by the 1920s, those effects prompted many to reconsider the federal
government’s approach to Indian policy. In 1928, the Meriam
Report documented the current state of much of Indian Country and
emphasized the negative impacts of prior federal policies on the
health, education, wealth, and economies of the nation’s tribes.79
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s appointment of John Collier
as Commissioner of Indian Affairs further hastened the shift away
from allotment as Collier sought to promote tribal interests and
reduce the role of the federal Indian Service.80 Collier recognized
the failures of allotment from both the federal and tribal
perspectives, noting in 1934 that allotment “stripped [the Indians] of
their property … disorganized [them] as groups and pushed [them]
to a lower social level as individuals” all while increasing federal
costs and compelling his federal agency “to be a real-estate agent in
behalf of the … allottees.”81 Collier’s push for reforming federal
Indian policy and the broader social and political support for FDR’s
New Deal ultimately led to the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA),
which put an end to allotment and refocused federal Indian policy
on tribal self-government and control.82
The purpose of the IRA was to redefine the federal-tribal
relationship by formally ending allotment, restoring unallotted and
open “surplus” lands to tribes, allowing and encouraging the
reacquisition of other lands by tribes, and promoting tribal selfgovernment and commerce through the adoption of constitutions
and incorporation of so-called section 17 corporations.83 In
furtherance of tribal control, Congress expressly vested those tribes
79
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that elected to adopt a constitution pursuant to the IRA with the right
“to prevent the sale, disposition, lease or encumbrance of tribal
lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of
the tribe.”84 Although the IRA did not address the specifics of
leasing or expressly amend the earlier mineral and oil and gas
leasing laws described above, it did establish a new federal-tribal
dynamic for addressing these issues.
This new dynamic was the result of a shift in how the federal
government viewed both tribal sovereignty and its trust
responsibility. In urging Congress to enact the IRA in the months
leading up to its final adoption, President Roosevelt echoed the
century-old words of Chief Justice Marshall, suggesting that the
trust responsibility required federal support for tribal sovereignty.
We can and should, without further delay, extend to
the Indian the fundamental rights of political liberty
and local self-government and the opportunities of
education and economic assistance that they require
in order to attain a wholesome American life. This is
but the obligation of honor of a powerful nation
toward a people living among us and dependent upon
our protection.85
Thus, rather than the top-down federal dominance of the
allotment era that largely unilaterally dictated destructive and
conflicting policies toward the ownership and development of tribal
resources, the IRA—at least in purpose—sought a more balanced
federal-tribal relationship and justified that re-balancing, at least in
part, on the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes.
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Though not immediate, the reforms of the IRA led to a
reexamination of the leasing scheme for Indian minerals and, in June
1937, Charles West, the Acting Secretary of the Interior, sent a
proposed bill to Congress that, if enacted, would “govern the leasing
of Indian lands for mining purposes.”86 In transmitting the proposed
bill, Acting Secretary West noted the various statutory bases of
leasing of minerals and oil and gas, including the 1891 act, as
amended in 1924, and the 1919 act, and made clear that one purpose
of his proposed legislation was to “obtain uniformity so far as
practicable of the law relating to the leasing of tribal lands for
mining purposes.”87 West also explained the inefficiencies of the
process under the 1919 act and the limitations on developing coal
on Indian lands, suggesting that the current statutory structure was
not “adequate to give the Indians the greatest return from their
property.”88 Thus, West’s proposal sought to “bring all mineral
leasing matters in harmony with the [IRA].”89
As ultimately passed by Congress, the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act (IMLA) furthered West’s intentions by providing a
uniform process for leasing minerals from unallotted Indian lands,90
requiring tribal consent for all such leases,91 and mandating
competitive bidding (unless the tribe consents to private
negotiations) and acceptance of the highest bid for oil and gas leases
unless the Secretary of the Interior determined such acceptance was
unwise or contrary to the tribe’s bests interests.92 Congress also
86
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authorized the Secretary to adopt rules and regulations to guide
implementation of the IMLA,93 and the first version of those
regulations included the minimum rent and royalty that must be paid
to a tribe pursuant to an IMLA lease.94 These primary features of the
IMLA served the main purposes of West’s proposal to provide
uniformity, encourage tribal self-government and control, and
promote economic development and return for tribes.
In addition, in an effort to harmonize the IMLA with the
IRA, the IMLA did “in no manner restrict the right of tribes” that
had chosen to organize under the IRA to lease their lands “in
accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter
adopted” pursuant to the IRA.95 Building on this statutory language,
the initial IMLA regulations recognized the right of IRA tribes to
supersede those rules through constitution, bylaw, charter,
ordinance, resolution or other authorized action.96 This language
remains in the IMLA regulations, although now with the proviso
that “tribal law may not supersede the requirements of Federal
statutes applicable to Indian mineral leases.”97 The proviso was
added in 1996 after the first major overhaul of the IMLA leasing
regulations since 1938 and, in publishing those revised regulations,
the Department noted that the proviso clarified that tribes could not
avoid Secretarial approval of each IMLA lease.98 The 1996 Final
Rule also purported to limit tribal authority to supersede federal
IMLA regulations and require secretarial approval for any such
proposed supersession.99 In recent litigation, the Department has
argued that the recognition of the authority of IRA tribes in the
IMLA applies only to that Act’s leasing provisions, i.e., public
auction, advertisement, and bidding, and not to “laws or regulations
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governing oil and gas extraction operations on tribal land.”100 Thus,
the apparent recognition of independent tribal authority for leasing
in 25 U.S.C. § 396b has gone largely unexercised and has been
significantly narrowed by subsequent regulatory and interpretive
stances.101
Indeed, overriding federal involvement in the leasing and
development of minerals under the IMLA largely eclipsed the law’s
intended promotion of tribal self-government. Aside from the tribal
consent required for leasing and to engage in the private negotiation
of leases, the BIA mostly controlled the IMLA leasing process
through standard leasing forms102 and unilateral authority to cancel
a lease.103 The IMLA’s mandate that, once entered for an initial tenyear term, leases would remain in effect so long as minerals were
“produced in paying quantities” further compounded the effect of
that authority.104 Although the IMLA regulations set a floor for rents
and royalties in each lease,105 once approved, those leases remained
in effect, often with royalty amounts that were far outstripped by the
changing market and other conditions.106
Although some tribes were able to negotiate decent
concessions, many lacked sufficient information regarding their
resources to do so. 107 As a result of the sparse information available
and the state of many tribal governments at the time, “[d]uring the
1950s and 1960s when many of the early mineral contracts were
negotiated, tribes had few alternatives to relying upon BIA.”108 Even
then, in at least one instance, the BIA’s efforts to honor tribal
decision-making were also frustrated by the rigidity of the IMLA’s
100
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structure.109 The federal government also failed to adequately
calculate, collect, and pay royalties (such as they were) on many
leases, leading to an extensive investigation and review of the entire
federal royalty system.110 Worst of all, even when tribal efforts to
negotiate better IMLA deals were derailed by ex parte collusion
between the Secretary of the Interior and the other parties to the
negotiations, the Supreme Court excused the federal government
from any liability for damages relying, in part, upon the IMLA’s
purported aim of promoting tribal self-determination.111 Thus,
although the IMLA was intended to serve the IRA’s purposes of
promoting tribal self-determination and economic development,
nearly half a century of leasing under the act led tribes to chafe at its
lack of flexibility and their inability to assert greater governmental
control over the management of their own resources.112 These
concerns became particularly acute in the late 1970s as tribal
governments became more sophisticated and came to better
understand both their own political and technical capacities.113
D. Alternatives to Leasing under the IMLA
Just as the IMLA effectuated the federal trust
responsibility—and restraint on alienation—of Indian mineral
resources,114 federal law also required federal involvement in and
approval of various other types of tribal dealings. For example, in
1955, Congress enacted what has become known as the Indian
Long-Term Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 415, which authorized the
leasing of Indian-owned surface lands for “public, religious,
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education, recreation, residential, or business purposes.”115
Similarly, the federal law dating to 1872 and amended in 1958,
provided requirements for contracting with tribes and individual
Indians “for the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of
value … or for the granting or procuring of any privilege … in
consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands.”116
As amended in the late 1950s, 81 of the statute required that any
such “services” contracts be in writing, with duplicates or copies
delivered to each party, have a fixed term of duration, and be
approved in writing by the Secretary of the Interior and the
commissioner of Indian affairs, among other required details.117
Notwithstanding the above limitations dictated by federal
law, in the late 1970s, some tribes creatively interpreted the
contracting process outlined in federal law to expand their ability to
enter mineral development deals beyond the restrictive leasing-only
regime of the IMLA.118 In 1982, the Department of the Interior
identified six federally-approved non-lease agreements for the
development of mineral resources, “[t]he approval authority [for
which] was based on section 81.”119 In addition, some tribes urged
that a broad reading of the term “lease” in the IMLA could allow for
the approval of joint venture and other more flexible development
arrangements.120 In fact, leasing regulations proposed by the
Department of the Interior in 1977 and 1980 supported such
interpretations.121 The potential for such flexibility was, however,
115
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called into serious question later in 1980, however, when one such
alternative arrangement, proposed by and between the Northern
Cheyenne Tribe and ARCO, led Clyde O. Martz, then Solicitor of
the Department of the Interior, to conclude that the Department had
no statutory authority to approve such agreements.122 This reversal,
called the “final betrayal” by one prominent tribal leader, led tribes
to refocus their push for broader flexibility from the negotiating
table to the halls of Congress.123
E. The Indian Mineral Development Act:
Reform on a deal-by-deal basis
Tribal frustration with the limitations of the IMLA and the
federal government’s management of leasing thereunder led many
tribes to seek other avenues for pursuing energy development. The
energy market of the mid- and late 1970s and the desire of the energy
industry to find and develop domestic energy sources offered
significant potential gains for tribes, particularly in comparison to
their losses under the IMLA.124 This potential, in combination with
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the recent ushering in of a new era of federal policy devoted to
promoting tribal self-determination and the growing technical and
governance capabilities of tribes,125 changed the face of Federal
Indian energy policy once again.
Congress passed the Indian Mineral Development Act
(IMDA) on December 22, 1982.126 Based on the concerns raised by
various tribes, allottees, developers, and federal officials, Congress’
intent in doing so was specifically focused on “provid[ing] Indian
tribes flexibility for the development and sale of their mineral
resources.”127 This flexibility sought to serve the same objectives
that the IMLA had nearly 50 years earlier, “first, to further the policy
of self-determination and second, to maximize the financial return
tribes can expect for their valuable mineral resources.”128
Beyond seeking to promote goals similar to those of the
IMLA, the IMDA also employed a structure similar to that of the
IMLA, as both focused on the development, review, and approval
of an individual development transaction. Where the IMLA had
authorized only leases, however, the IMDA expanded the types of
agreements to be employed in such transactions to include “any joint
venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or
other agreement,” which were collectively referred to as a “Minerals
Agreements.”129 The IMDA also eliminated the federal role in the
auction and award of leases and instead required that, upon the
request of a tribe and subject to the “extent of his available
resources,” the Secretary “shall have available advice assistance,
and information during the negotiation of a Minerals Agreement.”130
The IMDA provided clear guidance for the federal review and
Indians’ game rules . . . [and] with the rise in oil prices, . . . the stakes” of the
game too.)
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approval of each such agreement by requiring that the Secretary
consider whether the agreement would be in the “best interest of the
Indian tribe or …individual Indian … party,” including the
“potential economic return … , the potential environmental social
and cultural effects … , and provisions for resolving disputes.”131
Thus, the IMDA removed the stringent lease-only shackles of the
IMLA and opened the door for tribes to negotiate their own deals
while retaining federal review and approval requirements generally
consistent with the overriding federal trust responsibility. In view of
the expansion of tribal negotiating authority, however, the IMDA
limited the potential liability of the federal government “for losses
sustained by a tribe or individual Indian” resulting from any
Minerals Agreement approved by the Secretary in compliance with
the statute.132
The IMDA offered a much needed remedy to the tribal
complaints about the IMLA’s narrow authority and the expanding
use of alternative agreements to sidestep those limitations. But,
much as the IMLA’s shortcomings ultimately demanded further
legislative action, the IMDA has not entirely fulfilled its objectives
of promoting tribal self-determination and maximum economic
return. Initially, national and international energy and economic
policies during the first Reagan administration severely undermined
tribal economic positions and bargaining power.133 The push to
boost domestic energy production motivated an increase in global
production and, in the words of one commentator, “the ‘energy
crises’ of the 1970s turned into the ‘oil glut’ of the mid-1980s.”134
The resulting weakened position of many energy companies left
tribes seeking deals more like the one-sided IMLA leases than the
broader and more balanced arrangements made possible by the
IMDA.135 By 1988, about half of the sixty-seven IMDA agreements
entered into by tribes since the passage of the act were leased like
those authorized by the IMLA with only slight modifications that
could allow for escalating royalties or other benefits not available
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under the strict IMLA structure.136 Although the IMDA intended to
allay some of these difficulties by providing that the Secretary
would assist tribes in the negotiation of Mineral Agreements, the
Department of the Interior noted that such assistance could prove
“unwieldy and potentially very costly.”137 Congress never
appropriated funds to support any additional assistance from
Interior, leaving the full benefits of IMDA’s flexibility further
unrealized.138
In recognition of the continuing challenges faced by tribes
seeking to develop their own energy resources, Congress, as part of
the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act of 1992, included a
title specifically dedicated to Indian energy resources.139 In doing
so, Congress sought to “support … Indian tribes to develop the
institutional capacity to participate fully in the development of
[reservation] energy resources.”140 Just as the IMLA and IMDA
both sought to promote economic development and tribal
sovereignty, the purposes of the Indian energy title in the 1992 Act
were to “allow Indian tribes to become more self-sufficient [and]
provide[ ] Indian tribes with the technical and financial assistance to
control the development of … natural resources.”141
To fulfill these purposes, Congress created a demonstration
program to help support the building of tribal “managerial and
technical expertise” to promote tribal assumption of control over the
development of mineral resources.142 The 1992 Act also authorized
grants by the Secretary of the Interior to assist tribes “in the
development, administration, implementation, and enforcement of
tribal laws and regulations governing the development of energy
resources on Indian reservations.”143 Lastly, the 1992 Act
established the Indian Energy Resource Commission (the
Commission) to study, among other related topics, the “barriers or
obstacles to the development of energy resources on Indian
reservations, and make recommendations designed to foster the
development of energy resources on Indian reservations and
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promote economic development.”144 Despite its early intentions,
Congress never funded the study and the Commission never fulfilled
its mandate. The Commission’s statutory authorization was repealed
by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPACT),145 and nothing in the
1992 Act changed the federal statutory structures by which tribes
could authorize the development of their mineral resources.
At the end of the twentieth century, then, notwithstanding
the successful efforts of many tribes to push for the IMDA and
expand their ability to negotiate and enter broader and more flexible
energy development deals, Congress was still seeking a better
solution to promote tribal economic development and selfdetermination in its tribal energy policy—congressional (and tribal)
objectives that had been at the forefront since the IMLA’s passage
in 1938. The next statutory efforts to meet these goals opened the
door for the modern era of Federal Indian energy policy with the
promise of a refined federal trust relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes.
F. The Indian Tribal Energy Development
and Self-Determination Act of 2005
Though the Indian energy title of the 1992 Energy Policy Act
planted the seeds for the reform of Federal Indian energy policy, that
reform did not begin to take shape for nearly a decade. In 2003, two
Indian energy bills sought to build on the technical and financial
assistance promised in the 1992 Act, but also initiated a discussion
of the federal trust responsibility as it related to the review and
approval of certain energy-related transactions.146 For example,
each of the proposals included provisions that would remove the
requirement of federal approval for certain leases, agreements, or
rights-of-way, provided that each such lease, agreement or right-ofway was authorized by the tribe in accordance with tribal regulations
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approved by the Secretary.147 Although the proposals varied slightly
in their scope and application,148 each established minimum
standards for the tribal regulations that would govern such
approvals, including a requirement that the tribal regulations
provide an environmental review process similar to that required by
the National Environmental Policy Act.149 As part of such a review,
the tribal regulations would mandate an opportunity for “public”
review and comment on the lease, agreement, or right-of-way and
one of the legislative proposals would have required consultation
with the local state.150 In addition, each proposal included provisions
that would allow for challenges of tribal actions based on alleged
non-compliance with Secretarially-approved tribal regulations.151
Finally, just as with the IMDA, the proposals included waivers of
any federal liability that might result from tribal decisions made in
accordance with their own, secretarially-approved regulations.152
These proposals for reform provided tribes yet another
option for pursuing the development of their energy resources and
corresponding economic benefits. Unlike the IMLA and the IMDA,
however, these proposals did not focus on individual agreements,
whether they be leases under the IMLA or Minerals Agreements
under the IMDA. Instead, the new proposals offered each tribe the
option to assume broader regulatory review and approval
responsibilities for all future energy-related leases, agreements, and
rights-of-way, provided that tribal regulations meet certain
standards, receive federal approval, and guide tribal decisions. This
shift in focus marked a further change in the federal trust
responsibility as it authorized, if not promoted, federal review and
approval of expanded tribal governmental authority, subject to
certain limitations, rather than requiring federal review and approval
of each individual transaction. Thus, instead of determining whether
the terms and conditions of an IMLA lease or a proposed IMDA
Minerals Agreement would be in the best interests of a tribe, these
proposals instead authorized tribes to take on the responsibilities
(and corresponding administrative costs and burdens) for reviewing
147
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and approving their own agreements according to their own
regulations. Thereafter, the federal government would be excused
from any liability for those decisions. Although this new conception
of the federal trust responsibility was met with a mixed reception
from tribes and commentators,153 the provisions, with some
refinement, found their way into Title V of the Energy Policy Act of
2005, which was enacted as the Indian Tribal Energy Development
and Self-Determination Act (ITEDSDA).154
The ITEDSDA created a new forum for the negotiation of
energy-related agreements. Rather than focusing on federal
oversight of deals negotiated and reached between Indian tribes and
lessees, developers, or partners in their energy resource plans, the
ITEDSDA established Tribal Energy Resource Agreements
(TERAs) to be entered into by and between a tribe and the
Secretary.155 Far more than just transaction-specific or resourcespecific terms, a TERA would instead delineate a tribe’s authority
to enter and approve their own “lease or business agreement for the
purpose of energy resource development on tribal land,” subject to
certain conditions, and thereby obviate the need for federal approval
of each such lease or agreement.156 The necessary conditions for
approval of a TERA evolved from those first proposed in the early
2000s and included that the tribe have an environmental review
process requiring public notice and input;157 that the tribe’s process
for approving a lease, business agreement, or right-of-way meet
certain standards applicable to each such transaction;158 and that a
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tribe have “sufficient capacity to regulate the development of energy
resources of the tribe.”159
Thus, the ITEDSDA, building on the concepts of its earliest
proposals, created yet another new avenue for tribes to pursue
energy development. Unlike the IMLA and the IMDA, which
remain options for tribes to consider, the ITEDSA authorized a shift
of the federal government’s role in the development of tribal energy
resources away from overseeing, reviewing, perhaps secondguessing, and approving a tribe’s business judgment and negotiating
skill represented in an individual transaction. Instead, the ITEDSDA
envisioned a broader federal responsibility focused on tribal
regulatory capacity and standards, but still retained a responsibility
for reviewing such capacity and standards in light of the values and
standards of the federal regulatory scheme.160 As described in
greater detail below, the retention of these and other aspects of
Federal Indian energy policy’s zero-sum history has overshadowed
the promise of such a shift (at least thus far). In addition, the
approach detailed in the next section, which is more consistent with
this modern view of the trust responsibility, has also overtaken the
TERA model as an avenue for reform.
G. The Helping Expedite Affordable and Responsible Tribal
Home-ownership (HEARTH) Act of 2012
As described above, the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act of
1955, which provides statutory authority for the leasing of the
surface of tribal and individual trust lands for certain purposes, has
at times been seen as a mechanism for facilitating tribal energy
development.161 Recently, the broader push for opportunities to
develop solar and wind energy resources has highlighted how
surface leasing can contribute to these industries and enhance tribal
economic development.162 Like the evolution of the trust
responsibility as it related to mineral development, the role of the
159
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federal government in reviewing and approving surface leases for
tribal lands has shifted away from its paternalistic origins and
toward a greater recognition of and support for tribal regulatory
authority.
The most recent example of this shift in the surface leasing
context is the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal
Home Ownership Act (HEARTH Act) of 2012.163 Although the
1955 Indian Long-Term Leasing Act had previously been amended
to allow certain tribes to review and approve their own surface leases
without Secretarial approval,164 the HEARTH Act amended the
statute to authorize surface lease approval authority over tribal lands
for any tribe choosing to pursue such authority by seeking
Secretarial approval of the tribe’s proposed leasing regulations.165
Just like the TERA structure authorized by the ITEDSDA, the
HEARTH Act required that the tribal regulations meet certain
standards, including that they are “consistent with” federal leasing
regulations and provide for an environmental review process
including public notice, an opportunity for comment, and responses
to those comments.166 Also like the ITESDA, the HEARTH Act
allows for interested parties to challenge tribal decisions and allows
the Secretary to review whether a tribe has complied with its own
regulations in the approval of a lease.167 Unlike the ITEDSDA, the
HEARTH Act did not require any determination of tribal capacity
or formal agreement—such as a TERA—between a tribe and the
Secretary.168 Rather, tribes seeking additional authority under the
HEARTH Act simply had to ensure “consistency” between their
regulations and federal leasing regulations.169
The adoption of new federal leasing regulations expanded
the reach of the HEARTH Act into energy development. On
December 4, 2012, the Department of the Interior published final,
revised leasing regulations applicable to Residential, Business, and
Wind and Solar Resource Leases on Indian Land.170 Though the
163
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prior regulations provided procedures for the review and approval
of business leases under the authority of the Indian Long-Term
Leasing Act—which could have included leases for certain energyrelated facilities—the 2012 regulations made explicit a process for
tribes seeking to lease tribal land for the purposes of solar or wind
energy projects.171 When combined with the HEARTH Act’s option
for additional tribal regulatory and approval authority, these leasing
regulations, by specifying the procedures for the leasing of tribal
land for renewable energy purposes,172 offered another new avenue
for tribes to pursue greater authority over energy development on
their lands. Just as the ITEDSDA had formalized the shift of the
federal government’s focus from individual mineral development
deals to broader tribal authority, the HEARTH Act and the new
federal leasing regulations offered a way for tribes to remove federal
approval from the equation for wind and solar energy-related
surface leases.
Both the ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act offered new
opportunities for tribal authority in hopes of promoting the same
purposes forwarded by the IMLA and the IMDA– the seemingly
straightforward but apparently challenging twin aims of tribal selfdetermination and economic development. Despite the promise of
these new approaches, however, in June 2015, the United States
Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report
detailing the challenges that tribes face when seeking to develop
their energy resources.173 Among other factors, the GAO determined
that a complex regulatory framework, largely the product of the
federal statutory scheme detailed supra, contributes to hindrances
on tribal development.174 The federal role in the development of
tribal energy resources implicates broader federal policies and
responsibilities, such as those promoted by the National
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Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),175 the Endangered
Species Act (ESA),176 and the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA).177 As a result, some interviewed by the GAO indicated that
they believed that “the applicability of some of these laws results in
Indian lands being managed according to priorities generally
associated with public lands and that review processes and
requirements associated with the acts can hinder development.”178
Therefore, although the HEARTH Act and the TERA’s of the
ITEDSDA seem to offer new solutions to the challenges of
promoting tribal authority and the corresponding reduction of the
federal role in energy development, neither has yet lived up to its
potential.
III.

STILL ZERO-SUM: ISSUES WITH TERAS AND
THE HEARTH ACT AND CURRENT
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

Despite the shift of federal oversight and responsibility
promised by the ITEDSDA, as of early 2017, nearly a dozen years
after they were authorized by the ITEDSDA, no TERA exists
between a tribe and the federal government. A number of factors
have been identified by tribes, scholars, and the GAO to explain why
tribes have yet to enter a TERA.179 Most of these factors illustrate
the ITEDSDA’s adoption of the single-axis approach of federaltribal energy oversight. For example, the environmental review
process that a tribe must put in place in order to enter a TERA
requires public (including non-tribal) review and comment on
proposed leases, agreements, and rights-of-way to be approved by a
tribe.180 While consistent with the general federal policy expressed
by the NEPA, non-tribal member review and comment on tribal
decision-making may not be consistent with tribal interests and
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values. In addition, the ITEDSDA’s waiver of federal liability for
“any negotiated term” of a tribally-approved agreement, while
perhaps fair in light of the lack of federal approval of any such
agreement, has been viewed as a diminishment of the federal trust
responsibility.181 This perception is consistent with the zero-sum
conception of federal and tribal authority as it demands that the
assumption of authority by tribes be accompanied by a
corresponding elimination of federal responsibility. Similarly, the
regulations implementing ITEDSDA allow tribes to assume
“activities normally carried out by the Department [of the Interior]
except for inherently Federal functions.”182 In doing so, the
regulations sought to preserve some portion of the federal end of the
federal-tribal axis; however, the regulations failed to define what
those functions might be. Lastly, the ability of a tribe to enter a
TERA hinges upon the tribe’s capacity, as determined by the
Secretary, to carry out the TERA’s functions.183 By establishing an
overly complex application and assessment process for that
determination without a correspondingly strong commitment to
work with tribes to build such capacity, the ITEDSDA further
confirms the zero-sum approach. With a dozen years of no success,
some question the continuing worthiness of TERAs and the
ITEDSDA approach.184
Since the HEARTH Act’s 2012 enactment, over twenty
tribes have assumed responsibility for review and approval of
surface leases on their lands.185 Of these tribes, however, as of early
2017, only a few had regulations approved for wind and solar or
solar resource leases.186 Like ITEDSDA’s adoption of the zero-sum
181
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approach to authorizing tribal authority, the HEARTH Act includes
similar tribal environmental review process requirements and
waiver of federal liability.187 Beyond these limitations, the
HEARTH Act does not provide a tribe with comprehensive
authority to pursue energy development, as it addresses only surface
leasing authority and does not allow tribes to approve rights-of-way
that might be necessary and incidental to such surface development.
Although the ITEDSDA and HEARTH Acts represent the
most advanced evolution of the federal-tribal relationship as it
relates to energy development, their shortcomings have led to a
number of recent proposals to further reform or build upon their
approaches. Most prominent among the legislative efforts were two
such proposals included in comprehensive national energy policy
bills passed in 2016.188 The Senate’s version of that bill focused on
enhancing and streamlining the TERA process by simplifying the
capacity determination and application process while also making
funding available to tribes that assume greater authority pursuant to
a TERA.189 That version would have also broadened the
applicability of TERAs by including tribal authority for approving a
wider range of energy-related agreements and removing the
requirement of secretarial approval for certain such agreements
entered into between a tribe and a “tribal energy development
organization” that has been certified as such by the Secretary.190 In
reporting the bill, which later became part of the broader Energy
construction. By comparison, since 2005, 686 utility-scale wind projects and
778 utility-scale solar projects have been constructed on non-tribal lands. GAO15-502, supra note 9, at 2-3.
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Policy Modernization Act of 2016 out of his Senate Indian Affairs
Committee, Chairman John Barrasso specifically noted the findings
of the 2015 GAO Report and described how the proposed
amendments aimed “to provide direction and clarity” for the TERA
process.191
In addition to its TERA-focused provisions, the Senate
Indian energy proposal included a number of miscellaneous
provisions, including proposals to reform and streamline the federal
appraisal process for tribal energy or mineral resources held in
trust192 and to authorize federally-supported tribal weatherization
and biomass demonstration projects.193 In addition, just as the
expansion of the Navajo Nation’s (the Nation) ability to enter
surface leases without secretarial approval served as a precursor to
the HEARTH Act,194 the bill proposed a further expansion of the
Nation’s surface leasing authority to include the ability to enter into
a mineral lease without secretarial approval, provided the Secretary
had approved the Nation’s leasing regulations.195 The proposed
provision would effectively apply the HEARTH Act approach to
Navajo trust mineral development instead of the more complicated
TERA application and capacity determination process. But, by
simply adding mineral leases to the Nation’s existing surface leasing
authority, the proposal would not require that the Nation adopt
regulations consistent with the federal mineral development
regulations under the IMLA and IMDA.196
While the Senate took a TERA-focused approach with the
addition of a HEARTH Act-type proposal for the Navajo Nation in
its miscellaneous provisions, the House took a much more
scattershot approach in passing a number of provisions dedicated to
Indian energy that did not reference the ITEDSDA or TERAs at
all.197 Though the House version included a few of the same
miscellaneous provisions as the Senate version, such as the appraisal
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reform, biomass demonstration project, and the Navajo Nation
mineral leasing provisions, the heart of the House proposal was
aimed at narrowing the applicability and scope of the NEPA and
judicial review of projects on tribal lands.198 These provisions would
limit the environmental review of federal actions related to activities
on Indian lands to allow only tribal members, local residents or
governments within the area affected by the activity to comment on
the proposed action.199 Similarly, the bill sought to significantly
limit the availability of judicial review for “energy related actions”
and challenges to the federal approval of energy-related activity on
tribal lands.200 Thus, although the report accompanying the House
version pointed to many of the same challenges at which the
Senate’s proposal had aimed,201 the House sought to reform specific
aspects of the federal role in Indian energy development while the
Senate proposed enhancing the TERA avenue for tribes to seek
greater control. Though the omnibus energy policy legislation and
legislative efforts in the 114th Congress died,202 they are the basis of
additional legislative efforts to reform the TERA process and
address other tribal energy issues in the 115th Congress.203 As such,
these proposals remain narrowly focused like their zero-sum
predecessors.
In addition to legislative proposals for reform, officials
within the Department of the Interior also have sought to reform the
manner in which their department, and the agencies therein, carry
out the trust responsibility within the existing statutory framework
for Federal Indian energy policy. As with the efforts at legislative
reform, the GAO’s 2015 report on Indian energy development
provided an outline of administrative issues and gave the
Department of Interior a number of recommendations on which to
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base its reforms, but it largely avoided any consideration of the
broader structure of the trust relationship.204 Instead, the GAO
detailed the challenges facing the Bureau of Indian Affairs regarding
that agency’s lack of comprehensive data concerning the ownership
and use of Indian minerals, its lack of any defined or accountable
process for the agency’s review and approval of energy-related
transactions, and the dearth of well-qualified agency staff to handle
those procedures.205 Based on these concerns, the GAO report
recommended that the BIA Director further develop the agency’s
data and information system and also “develop a documented
process to track its review and response times.”206 In response, the
Department noted its efforts to implement a new software package
that would, in the Department’s view, address the information
shortage, but concurred with the need to develop an effective
process for tracking and accounting for the review and approval of
energy-related transactional documents.207 In addition to responding
to the issues raised in the GAO Report, the Department also touted
its efforts to establish an Indian Energy Service Center (IESC),
which would include representatives from various federal agencies
involved in Indian energy development to “provide expertise, policy
guidance, standardized procedures, and technical assistance across
a broad spectrum of services.”208 As noted by Interior’s Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary at the time, the collaborative approach
envisioned for the IESC would “reflect the spirit of the White House
Council on Native American Affairs,”209 which was created by
Executive Order in June 2013 in an effort “to improve the
coordination of Federal programs and the use of resources available
to tribal communities.”210
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Notwithstanding these administrative reform efforts, a more
recent GAO review determined that more is needed in order to
effectively address the barriers to the efficient administration of the
federal trust responsibility for Indian energy development.211
Despite the spirit of collaboration envisioned by the White House
Council on Native American Affairs, the GAO in 2016 identified a
number of issues that may be preventing effective collaboration
among the members of the Council’s Energy Subgroup, including a
dearth of sustained leadership, failures on the part of participating
agencies to dedicate adequate and consistent resources, and the lack
of a documented process or framework for collaboration.212
Similarly, the GAO pointed out that the BIA’s development of the
IESC failed to “follow some leading practices or adhere to agency
guidance during [its] early stages … which may impact its
effectiveness.”213 These failures included the lack of an identified
lead agency, failure to effectively involve employees and their input,
and not documenting the basis for key decisions about the formation
and development of the IESC.214 Following on its 2015 findings, the
GAO’s 2016 report also noted continuing high vacancy rates at key
BIA offices and confirmed that some offices “may not have staff
with the level of competence that allows them to review some
energy development documents.”215 Compounding these
challenges, according to the GAO, is the BIA’s lack of detailed
workforce information, which prevents a comprehensive analysis of
workforce skills, needs, and competencies.216 In summing up this
challenge, the GAO aptly described the struggles faced by Federal
Indian energy policy more broadly: “[w]ithout current workforce
information on key skills needed for energy development, tribal
goals and priorities, and potential workforce resource gaps, BIA
may not have the right people with the right skills doing the right
jobs in the right place at the right time and cannot provide decision
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makers with information on its staffing needs going forward.”217
None of the GAO’s findings or recommendations looked at the
balance of the federal government’s trust responsibility; nor did the
GAO Report make any proposals for significant reform in that
regard.
Thus, a century and a quarter after the 1891 leasing act, the
structure, and implementation of the federal government’s trust
responsibilities for the leasing and development of tribal land and
energy resources remain in flux. Though federal priorities have
shifted from the destruction and exploitation of tribal resources
toward promoting the twin aims of tribal self-determination and
economic development,218 tribes continue to express frustration
about both the statutory framework and its administrative
implementation.219 Much of the frustration results from the limited
way in which that framework has treated the federal-tribal
relationship and the narrow means available for tribes to assume
greater authority over energy development.
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At one end of this debate are those who characterize the
shortcomings of current policy in terms of federal overreach and the
need to minimize the federal presence.220 This characterization is
consistent with recent proposals for regulatory reform,221 but is also
cloaked in the language of promoting tribal sovereignty and selfdetermination.222 Nonetheless, for many in Indian Country, these
arguments sound like the diminishment of the federal trust
responsibility and therefore echo the specters of allotment and
termination.223
At the other end of the spectrum are tribes, tribal citizens,
environmental groups, and others concerned about the failure of the
federal government to adequately protect their trust resources from
the degradation and threat posed by energy development.224 The
zero-sum nature of Federal Indian energy policy also fails to serve
these interests. Where federal trust responsibility remains for the
review and approval of energy-related transactions, such as under
the IMLA or IMDA, the procedural requirements of NEPA,
220

See, e.g., Terry L. Anderson & Shawn Regan, It’s Time for the Feds to Get
Out of Indian Cnty., WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 7, 2016, https://www.wsj.
com/articles/its-time-for-the-feds-to-get-out-of-indian-country-1475880064
[https://perma.cc/8MTT-8KNB]
(last visited Dec. 5, 2017); Lance Morgan, Ending the Curse of Trust, INDIAN
CNTY. TODAY MEDIA NETWORK Mar. 23, 2015,
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.
com/news/ending-the-curse-of-trust/ [https://perma.cc/YDU4-XVXN].
221
See, e.g., Enforcing the Regulatory Reform Agenda, Exec. Order No. 13,777,
82 Fed. Reg. 12,285 (Feb. 24, 2017) (reviewing President Trump’s earlier
actions on regulatory reform and directing review and reform of federal
regulations by each agency).
222
See, e.g., Congressman Markwayne Mullin Press Release, Mullin Statement
on Tribal Sovereignty, CONGRESSMAN MARKWAYNE MULLIN (Dec. 5, 2016),
https://mullin.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=415
[https://perma.cc/6GM3-KBDM] [hereinafter Mullin Statement].
223
See Valerie Volcovici, Trump Advisors Aim to Privatize Oil-Rich Indian
Reservations, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2016, 4:23 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trump-tribes-insight-idUSKBN13U1B1[https://perma.cc/7AU46FZ9].
224
See e.g., Complaint, Pawnee Nation v. Jewell, No. 4:16-cv-00697-JHP-TLW
(N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2016) (alleging that the approval of various oil and gas
leases and permits by both BIA and BLM “have run roughshod over Pawnee
natural resource protection laws, disregarded a tribal moratorium on new oil and
gas approvals, and violated the agencies’ trust responsibilities to the Pawnee.”)
Though not specifically related to energy development in Indian Country, the
Standing Rock and Cheyenne River Sioux Tribes raised similar concerns over
the federal government’s role (through the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) in
reviewing and approving the proposed Dakota Access Pipeline. Standing Rock
Sioux Tribe v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d, 4 (D.D.C.
2016).

76

including the ESA and other federal standards, may provide some
assurance to those concerned about the environmental impacts.225
Given the federal-tribal relationship, however, the conduct and
result of those reviews may be deferential to tribal government
decision-making, which may or may not adequately account for the
concerns of environmental organizations.226 Conversely, the
reliance upon federal statutes as a basis for challenging tribal
development decisions effectively denigrates tribal status while
reifying federal supremacy. Professor Ezra Rosser examined this
conflict in detail with regard to environmental permitting of a coal
mine and power plant supported by the Navajo Nation, explaining
that “[t]he current federal permitting process . . . seems to put
environmental organizations in the position of either having to give
up on their larger environmental goals or participate in the
colonialism of federal environmental policy.”227
Despite the efforts of more recent initiatives—like
ITEDSDA and the HEARTH Act—to remove the federal
government from the review and approval process for energyrelated or surface leasing transactions, each of those statutes requires
that tribes essentially adopt the federal review process, a NEPAlite,228 and ultimately allow for federal review of alleged noncompliance on the part of tribes exercising such authority.229 These
limitations restrict the ability of tribal regulatory schemes to respond
to the “quantitatively and qualitatively different risks and impacts”
of energy development on tribal lands, including risks to tribal
homelands, culturally significant sites, and environments.230
Without a broader conception of the federal-tribal relationship and
a trust responsibility that allows for more tribal flexibility, these
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risks are left to federal agencies, federal courts, and federal
regulations to resolve.
In addition, many tribal citizens have expressed concern
about the willingness and ability of their own tribal governments to
provide similar protection for tribal resources in the event that the
federal government authorizes broader tribal oversight.231 These
concerns relate less to the balance of federal or tribal authority over
the development and instead focus on the effectiveness of such
authority in responding to the concerns of local tribal citizens. While
the challenges facing tribal governments are many and varied, the
history of federal involvement and oversight, particularly through
the establishment of IRA constitutions and governmental structures,
often results in a significant disconnect between the structures of
tribal governments and the concerns of tribal citizens.232 While
tribes across the country have begun to reconsider and reshape their
governments to better respond to this potential divide, the zero-sum
nature of Federal Indian energy policy remains narrowly focused
upon the tribal capacity to assume the federal regulatory role233
rather than the sustainability and effectiveness of tribal governance
within tribal communities.
Therefore, for many in Indian Country, it may matter less
whether the federal or local tribal government has authority for
authorizing, approving, and regulating energy development so long
as whichever entity with authority is adequately listening to and
addressing their concerns. Thus, though the axis around which
Federal Indian energy policy has turned has always been the
foundational (and illusory) notion that the federal government’s
role, and corresponding trust responsibility, must be balanced
against the role or interests of the tribes involved, the history of
Federal Indian energy policy has demonstrated the shortcomings of
this conception. With some notable but mostly singular
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exceptions,234 Federal Indian energy policy has largely failed to
successfully promote sustained economic development and tribal
self-determination. While legislative and administrative reform
efforts continue,235 they primarily focus on shifting the existing
federal regulatory review and approval process over to tribes
without a broader consideration of the shortcomings of that process,
the challenges it presents, or whether the process will even serve
tribal interests. To overcome this myopia and the likely failure of
such reforms, the remainder of this article proposes a new approach,
one based on a broader view of the trust responsibility and
unchained from the narrow proposals of the past.
IV.

THE THREAT OF OUR TIMES AND THE PROMISE
OF REFORM THROUGH RECOMMITMENT TO
A BROADER TRUST RESPONSIBILITY

To support a broader view of reform for Federal Indian
energy policy, this section begins by addressing a few fundamental
hurdles. First, reforming Federal Indian energy policy, like Indian
policy more broadly, demands consideration in a non-partisan
manner. The federal government’s trust responsibility to Indian
Country is not the product of a liberal or conservative agenda; rather,
it is rooted in the foundation of the constitution and federal law.
Therefore, political ideology can take a backseat to the question of
upholding the trust relationship; however, political issues and
partisan ideologies unconnected to Indian affairs can and have
interfered with the federal government’s willingness and ability to
carry out its trust responsibility. Second, new proposals must also
overcome the zero-sum history of federal-tribal relations and
separate the assumption and exercise of greater tribal authority from
a diminished federal role. Instead, the federal role must evolve to
234
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better accommodate and respond to the unique needs and concerns
of tribes beyond the narrow axis of federal versus tribal oversight.
A. The Threat of Political Ideology
The history of federal Indian policy demonstrates a
commitment by both conservatives and liberals alike to support and
promote tribal interests and the federal-tribal relationship.236The
lack of a partisan divide remains a hallmark of the Senate Committee
on Indian Affairs, which routinely reviews and approves legislation
introduced and co-sponsored by members of both political
parties.237 In fact, that Committee’s most recent action on Federal
Indian energy policy, approving a bill amending the ITEDSDA, was
bi-partisan in nature.238
Notwithstanding the non-partisan nature of the federal-tribal
relationship, however, federal Indian law and policy often get
tangled up in—and suffer from—partisan political interests. For
example, consistent with the non-partisan nature of tribal self-

236

Though built on statements from both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson,
President Richard M. Nixon was the first to formally commit the federal
government to the current era of tribal self-determination. See Richard Nixon,
Special Message to the Cong. on Indian Affairs, 213 PUB. PAPERS 564 (July 8,
1970). Since that time, nearly every President, regardless of political affiliation,
has recommitted the federal government to this principle. Gerald Ford,
Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 1 PUB. PAPERS 10 (Jan. 4, 1975); Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union
Annual Message to the Cong., THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 25, 1979),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32735 [https://perma.
cc/RZ2T-MFZX]; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Indian Policy, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 24, 1983), http://www.presidency.ucsb.
edu/ws/?pid=41665 [https://perma.cc/PP8T-5KGC]; George Bush, Statement
Reaffirming the Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship Between the Fed. Gov’t & Indian
Tribal Governments, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 14, 1991),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=19695&st=&st1= [https://perma.cc/54ZM-5S9Q]; William J.
Clinton, Remarks to Native Am. & Native Alaskan Tribal Leaders, THE AM.
PRESIDENCY PROJECT (April 29, 1994), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=50070 [https://perma.cc/8BMW-CQFN]; George W. Bush,
Memorandum on Gov’t-to-Gov’t Relationship with Tribal Governments, THE
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2004),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=64553&st=&st1=
[https://perma.cc/4EZR-RK57]; Barack Obama, Statement of Admin. Policy,
THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=111336 [https://perma.cc/AMC4-85RR].
237
Business Meeting, 161 CONG. REC. D76 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2015); Business
Meeting, 163 CONG. REC. D89 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 2017).
238
S. REP. NO. 115-84 (2017).

80

determination, President Reagan’s 1983 Statement on Indian Affairs
committed his administration to “remove the obstacles to selfgovernment by creating a more favorable environment for the
development of healthy reservation economies.”239 Echoing the
preceding decades of Federal Indian energy policy, President
Reagan’s policy touted the need to develop both tribal governments
and economies through energy resource development and suggested
that the role of the federal government was to encourage such
development in a manner consistent with “Indian values and
priorities.”240 But, contemporaneously with such worthy statements
on the federal-tribal relationship, the federal budget for Indian
affairs was being drastically cut,241 leading some to dub the Reagan
administration’s approach to Indian policy “termination by
accountants.”242 These cuts were consistent with broader economic
policies of the Reagan era,243 but as a result, tribal self-determination
and economic development suffered,244 and the BIA and IHS
budgets were set on a path of decades of diminished funding.245
Reform of Federal Indian energy policy must avoid being
viewed as or falling prey to a partisan political divides and broader
politically-driven agendas. As demonstrated above, the federal trust
responsibility in the area of Federal Indian energy policy has long
been conceived of as support for both tribal self-determination and
economic development. Though challenges remain in meeting those
goals, reform of such policy toward those ends cannot be cabined by
conservative or liberal principles.
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B. The Threat of a Continued Zero-Sum Approach
To achieve successful reform, Federal Indian energy policy
must also break free from its zero-sum past. Throughout its history,
Federal Indian energy policy has relied upon a singular view of
federal competence and corresponding tribal incompetence.246 As
demonstrated supra, the policy has evolved to allow tribes greater
authority only where they can demonstrate that they have overcome
the latter and are able to carry out federal functions in a manner
similar to or “consistent with” the federal government.247 This
approach is consistent with the broader approach of the selfdetermination era, in which tribes have contracted to take over
formerly federal programs, services, functions, and activities but
must meet federal performance standards to do so.248
While there are many benefits for tribes in taking on such
responsibilities,249 the approach demands consideration of a reduced
federal responsibility consistent with greater tribal authority. In
addition, tribes are authorized to fulfill the role of the federal
government in the manner of the federal government, which has
often failed Indian beneficiaries.250 Perhaps most perniciously for
reform efforts, viewing the balance of authority over energy
development in Indian Country as a federal-tribal dichotomy lends
credence to a view of reform in which the federal government helps
tribes by “getting out of the way,” which then justifies reduced
federal spending and involvement in carrying out the trust
responsibility.251 In assessing whether the federal government is
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liable for damages resulting from its failure to ensure that tribal
interests are protected when approving IMLA leases, the Supreme
Court relied upon a similar view of the federal-tribal dichotomy,
noting that “[i]mposing on the Government a fiduciary duty to
oversee management … would not have served” that statute’s
purpose of promoting tribal self-determination.252
While some tribes support the reduction and streamlining of
the federal oversight of tribal energy development, that support
recognizes the importance of tribal capacity in the management and
oversight of development.253 More nuanced than the zerosum/federal-tribal dichotomy approach, tribal criticism is largely
focused on the manner in which the federal trust responsibility is
carried out, which, in the tribal view, can frustrate tribal interests.254
This criticism is borne out by audit reports demonstrating the
shortcomings of federal energy management, including the lack of
accurate data and information, dearth of qualified staff in
appropriate positions, and lack of accountability or timeframes.255
Consistent with these reviews and tribal criticism, the focus
of reforming Federal Indian energy policy must be the manner in
which the federal government carries out its responsibilities, not
Trump’s Native American Affairs Coalition and within the House of
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simply how to reduce those responsibilities. Instead of reducing the
federal role in order to increase tribal self-determination, for
example, a realignment of federal priorities with regard to Federal
Indian energy policy could result in an expanded federal role and
increased tribal self-determination. Only by dismissing political
ideology and moving beyond the zero-sum approach can reform
successfully answer the central question of Federal Indian energy
policy for nearly a century—how can the federal government best
support tribal sovereignty and economic development through
energy development?
C. Proposing Reform: Stepping Toward a New
Trust Relationship
Fundamentally, reforming Federal Indian energy policy to
serve the twin aims of tribal self-determination and economic
development will require that the federal government first take a
step toward Indian tribes rather than stepping back or out of the way.
With rare exception,256 tribes demand greater legal, regulatory, and
technical capacities to ensure effective tribal management and
oversight of energy development. Though ITEDSDA recognized
these needs and authorized grants to tribes to develop such
capacities,257 tribal needs still outstrip federal support.258 In addition
to being underfunded, ITEDSDA’s authorization for appropriations
to fund these grants expired in 2016.259 A recommitment to
256
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expanding and enhancing the federal government’s support for tribal
capacity development is a necessary first step toward reform.
Importantly, however, a commitment to financial and other
support for building tribal capacity must avoid the pitfalls of the
“Planner’s Approach,” a term coined by the Harvard Project on
American Economic Development (HPAIED) to describe the
failures of various federal programs seeking to support tribal
economic development.260 According to one HPAIED Research
Affiliate, “[t]he Planner’s Approach was simplistic in treating
economic development as a fundamental question of resources and
expertise, as opposed to one of incentives and institutions.”261
Instead of such a narrow approach, HPAIED, after conducting
numerous studies of economic development across Indian Country,
promotes a “Nation Building” approach emphasizing the
importance of stable tribal governmental institutions, the
responsiveness of those institutions to tribal citizens and culture, and
the importance of tribal sovereignty.262 Considering these factors in
the design and development of effective federal support for tribal
capacity building would enhance the long-term stability and
effectiveness of such support. Therefore, the recommitment to
supporting tribal capacity building must take a long-term “Nation
Building” approach, including longer-term grant programs and
effective measures for success and accountability.
Beyond capacity building, the statutory framework for
federal oversight and approval of energy development in Indian
Country also requires reform. To maximize flexibility, the current
range of options for such development, including the IMLA, the
IMDA, TERAs and the HEARTH Act, should be retained; however,
a new paradigm is needed to overcome the deficiencies of these
current options.263 As with federal support for building tribal
capacity, statutory reform requires federal engagement with tribes
and tribal priorities and the development of options for tribes to
tailor their own authorities without rigidly conforming to the
interests or objectives of the federal government. This demand for
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flexibility aligns with the call from former Assistant Secretary
Kevin Gover that Congress should authorize the Department of the
Interior to negotiate agreements with tribes—on a tribe-by-tribe
basis—pursuant to which each tribe could “retain those aspects of
the trust that [it] finds useful and desirable and eliminate those that
[it does] not want.”264
The shortcomings of the HEARTH Act and ITEDSDA’s
TERAs demonstrate the need to consider Gover’s concept in
reforming Federal Indian energy policy. While a number of tribes
have taken advantage of the additional authority to review and
approve surface leases under the HEARTH Act, including leases for
solar and wind energy-related projects, the only authority that those
tribes are exercising was created by the federal government for itself
in the Indian Long-Term Leasing Act.265 In addition, the HEARTH
Act demands that tribes carry out that authority “consistent with”
the manner in which the federal government would have done so
and provide an environmental review process allowing for public
review of and input on proposed tribal decisions.266 Setting aside
whether such procedures and requirements could be effectively
adopted
by
tribal
governmental
institutions—including
considerations such as cultural match—the additional effect of those
requirements is the transfer of administrative burden and expense
from the federal government to tribal governments. Tribes must,
therefore, weigh those additional costs and burdens and the
management of a regulatory scheme that may or may not serve tribal
interests against the potential benefits resulting from the removal of
federal approval requirements for each lease. While some tribes
have decided that the benefits of assuming that authority outweighs
264
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the disadvantages, the HEARTH Act prevents a more flexible
allocation of the burdens and benefits between tribes and their
federal trustee.
The potential authority to be assumed by a tribe pursuant to
a TERA is broader than that allowed by the HEARTH Act,267 but
the conditions associated with negotiating and assuming such an
authority are both more stringent and less defined. For example, the
ITEDSDA’s tribal capacity requirements pose a significant hurdle
to TERA eligibility, but, unlike the HEARTH Act, which offers
tribes the opportunity to adopt an existing federal regulatory scheme
for approving surface leases,268 ITEDSDA provides no comparable
guides for developing tribal regulatory programs for a TERA. In
addition, the ITEDSDA’s requirement that the federal government
review and confirm a tribe’s capacity to enter a TERA echoes the
post-IRA and IMLA days of BIA dominance and paternalism. Like
tribal authority requirements under the HEARTH Act, however, the
public review and input requirements for tribal regulations may or
may not align with tribal institutional and cultural structures. And,
also like tribes pursuing authority under the HEARTH Act, any tribe
entering a TERA to assume broader approval authority is also taking
on significant administrative costs and responsibilities to carry out
those functions without any guarantee of financial support from the
federal trustee. Therefore, while a TERA presents a tribe with the
potential to assume a much broader range of authority than the
HEARTH Act’s surface leasing structure, acquiring such flexibility
is subject to much greater federal scrutiny and bureaucracy than the
HEARTH Act’s relatively straightforward approach.
Even though the HEARTH Act represents the furthest
evolution of the trust relationship toward tribal authority, both the
HEARTH Act and the TERA options still demand that tribes accept
a trade-off between greater authority and the flexibility to define that
authority as the tribe may see fit. Rather than requiring a tribal
assumption of federal duties, the next evolution of the trust
responsibility demands eliminating that trade-off and developing a
broader avenue for bilateral federal and tribal coordination of tribal
interests and federal trust obligations. Drawing on Gover’s notion of
a negotiated trust, tribes should be empowered to work with their
267
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federal trustee to establish a regulatory review and approval process
that is consistent with tribal institutional, environmental, and
cultural norms instead of pre-existing, historical, and potentially
inconsistent federal conceptions of the how to serve tribal interests.
The basis of Federal Indian energy policy should be a recognition
that each tribe can propose how best to oversee and regulate or
restrict development and then, with appropriate federal support,
build or enhance the governmental institutions necessary for doing
so. In negotiating the details of each such proposal, then, the federal
government could work with the tribe to identify how tribal property
and interests will be best protected, but importantly, neither the
tribal nor the federal government should be bound to a specific
regulatory scheme. Instead, with federal support, assistance, and,
potentially, co-management, tribal governments will be able to
develop their own energy policies, laws, rules and regulations as
they see fit.
D. Challenges to Reform
As this article demonstrates, the evolution of the trust
relationship in Federal Indian energy policy has been slow and
incremental. Given this inertia, instant reform of the type proposed
here is unlikely, but as shown in the next section, incremental
progress toward such reform is ongoing and likely to continue.
Nevertheless, there are challenges and potential drawbacks to the
type of reform described herein.
First, empowering tribes to develop, implement, and enforce
their own regulatory approaches to the management of energy
resources is likely to prompt concern on the part of neighboring
communities and citizens. For example, depending on how the tribe
chooses to consider, review, and approve projects related to such
management, non-tribal members may not be informed or have an
opportunity to comment on such management but may, nonetheless,
face environmental, social, or economic burdens as a result of tribal
decision-making. As noted above, both the HEARTH Act and the
TERA options for enhancing tribal authority addressed this issue by
requiring that tribes ensure public review and comment on lease or
energy-related proposals prior to tribal approval.269 While some
tribes may still include such opportunities in their regulatory
269

See supra notes 181-188.

88

approach, others have objected to these requirements as infringing
upon tribal sovereignty.270 Despite the apparent conflict between
tribal sovereignty and these broader interests, reforming the federaltribal relationship to allow for a broader conception of the tribal role
within Federal Indian energy policy would provide a middle road to
balance these sometimes competing forces. As noted above,271 many
tribes and tribal members already face internal conflicts over natural
resource management within their existing governmental structures.
These conflicts have led to turnover within tribal governments and
further development of tribal government institutions to address the
varied concerns of tribal citizens.272 Expanding the tribal presence
in energy management could allow consideration of these issues and
foster the development of stronger tribal institutions to address
them. In turn, enhancing tribal institutions could provide additional
avenues for dialogue between potentially competing for non-tribal
interests and tribal officials, avenues that are largely absent in the
existing zero-sum structure. Therefore, while conflicts over tribal
decision-making will certainly continue, reform would allow for
more robust tribal consideration of those conflicting views.
Reform of the type described herein also presents some
practical complications, particularly on the part of the federal
government. How, for example, would the federal government
negotiate its trust responsibilities on a tribe-by-tribe basis and
account for potentially 567 different, unique, and diverse tribal
demands? Similarly, the development of a broad range of tribal
regulatory and legal structures could deter non-Indian investors or
businesses seeking to bring much-needed investments to Indian
Country. These concerns may prove illusory, however, as the
existing diversity of tribal capabilities, interests, and priorities is
unlikely to result in an overwhelming demand for such negotiations
in the short term. As former Assistant Secretary Gover noted in
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making his proposal for reform, “tribal consent is a sine qua non in
the implementation of the policy,” and many tribes may be
unwilling to pursue reform of the federal trust responsibility in light
of more pressing tribal interests, such as law enforcement or
providing other services to tribal members.273 But, without an
opportunity to pursue a broader or negotiated federal-tribal
relationship, tribes who do seek such reform are hamstrung in their
efforts to do so. Therefore, an incremental and perhaps tribe-byspecific-tribe approach to legislative efforts at reform may prove to
be the best solution in the short-term, and a handful of proven
success stories may pave the way for increased tribal interest in the
future.274 Even without such tribal specific legislation, however,
there are already some examples of reform, which the next section
will address.
V.

POTENTIAL FIRST STEPS AND RELEVANCE
BEYOND ENERGY POLICY

While a more comprehensive legislative reform effort will
be needed to promote and support tribal capacity, encourage
development of tribal regulatory programs, and authorize the
negotiation of federal-tribal agreements regarding energy resource
management in Indian Country, recent tribal efforts demonstrate
how such legislation could take shape and the type of negotiated
federal-tribal agreement that might be possible.
A. Broadening Trust Management and Negotiating
Regulatory Authority
The Indian Trust Asset Reform Act provides a potential
starting point for legislative efforts toward such reform.275 That Act
authorizes tribes to submit to the Secretary a plan for managing a
trust asset and, so long as the tribe’s management would not violate
273
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any federal laws applicable to that asset, the tribe could then assume
such management authority, potentially even at a standard “lessstringent … than the Secretary would otherwise require or adhere to
in absence of an Indian trust asset management plan.”276 Unlike
ITEDSDA or the HEARTH Act, the Indian Trust Asset Reform Act
does not specifically require that a tribe adopt a particular regulatory
framework or ensure a public review and comment process in
managing a trust asset, other than forest resources or surface leasing
already subject to a tribe’s HEARTH Act regulations.277 Though this
Act focuses more specifically on the management of surface and
timber resources by tribes,278 it presents an alternative model for
Congress to consider beyond the current framework of Federal
Indian energy policy. By acknowledging and allowing a willing and
interested tribe to develop a plan for managing its own trust energy
resources, such an alternative model would encourage a flexible
federal-tribal relationship and promote the management and
oversight of tribal energy resources in accordance with tribal
interests and values.
Resolution of one tribe’s recent legal challenge to the Bureau
of Land Management’s (BLM) 2015 regulations regarding the use
of hydraulic fracturing in energy development on tribal lands
provides another example. Relying on the IRA and 25 C.F.R. section
211.29,279 the Southern Ute Indian Tribe asserted that its own tribal
regulations regarding hydraulic fracturing, adopted before the
BLM’s new regulations were set to take effect, superseded those
newer federal rules.280 Though a separate legal action resulted in the
BLM’s regulations being temporarily set aside,281 the tribe and
Department of the Interior continued to negotiate a settlement of the
tribe’s challenge. Ultimately, the parties agreed to disagree over
whether the tribe had the power to supersede the BLM rules;
however, in recognition of their shared interest in “regulating
hydraulic fracturing, based on their interest in both oil and gas
276
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development and environmental protection,” the tribe and
Department of Interior agreed that the federal parties to the case
would “recognize the tribe’s [hydraulic fracturing regulations] as the
governing rules regulating hydraulic fracturing for all Indian lands
within … the [Southern Ute] Reservation to the exclusion of [both]
the BLM’s” previous hydraulic fracturing regulations and practices
as well as the newer 2015 regulations.282 In the agreement, the
Department of Interior further recognized that the tribe’s regulations
met or exceeded the BLM’s own rules for regulating hydraulic
fracturing operations.283 The parties also negotiated a separate
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to describe the “respective
roles in cooperatively administering and enforcing the tribe’s
[regulations] in conjunction with BLM’s regulations.”284
Through both the Settlement Agreement and the MOA, the
federal government recognized and agreed to help enforce the
tribe’s regulations in lieu of the BLM’s otherwise applicable
regulatory authority. In addition, through negotiation of those
agreements, the federal government and the tribe identified and
agreed upon aspects of federal oversight and regulatory authority
that were workable, such as the BLM’s ongoing authority to review
and approve applications for permits to drill, while elevating tribal
decisions and priorities for how hydraulic fracturing would be
conducted, even if those decisions were not consistent with federal
rules. Thus, notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement over the
statutory authority for the tribe’s supersession argument, these
agreements provide a model for the negotiation and development of
cooperative tribal-federal regulatory authority over tribal energy
resources and management.285 These agreements also demonstrate
that the federal government need not get out of the way to allow
282
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tribal oversight and management of energy resources. Instead, as
this model shows, both governments can work together to ensure
proper regulation, with the tribe taking the lead and implementing
its own regulatory system that incorporates and reflects tribal
interests and values.
B. Reform beyond Federal Indian Energy Policy
In some ways, proposing to expand the federal-tribal
relationship with regard to Federal Indian energy policy tracks the
evolution of tribal self-determination and self-governance programs
under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
(ISDEAA).286 Pursuant to that Act and its numerous amendments
since original enactment in 1975, tribes across the country have
entered into agreements with the federal government to assume
responsibility for delivering federal programs, functions, services,
and activities (PSFAs) to their members and local citizens.287 In fact,
tribes that negotiate and enter into self-governance compacts are
able to exercise the significant freedom to redesign the way
previously federal PFSAs were carried out and reallocate federal
funding as they see fit.288 These programs have been quite
successful in shifting federal funding and control to tribes;289
however, the ongoing expansion of these programs has slowed, and
tribes still face limitations and challenges to the self-governance and
self-determination scheme under the ISDEAA that echo the limits
of Federal Indian energy policy. Therefore, broadening the trust
relationship through reform of Federal Indian energy policy could
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promote further reform of self-determination and self-governance
programs as well.
Thus, while the ISDEAA approach demonstrates the
viability of individualized tribal-federal agreements in the energy
realm, it is an imperfect model that also suffers from the history of
the zero-sum federal-tribal dynamic. As recently described by two
leading practitioners, the primary challenges posed by the current
state of tribal self-governance programs are the lack of sufficient and
sustained congressional funding, ongoing agency recalcitrance
toward negotiating and entering such agreements, and the narrow
scope of programs available for the assumption by tribes.290 Each of
these is fundamentally similar to the zero-sum approach of Federal
Indian energy policy as they all reflect the underlying assumption
that tribes may only assume funds, functions, or duties that the
federal government has deemed appropriate for tribal control and,
even then, such control may only be exercised in accordance with
federal standards. Agency and congressional failures to adequately
request and fund the development and maintenance of tribal
capacity necessary to carry out federal PFSAs has resulted in
decades of litigation and ongoing funding challenges.291 Just as with
TERAs and the HEARTH Act, therefore, tribes are often faced with
the prospect of assuming PFSAs and their corresponding
administrative burdens without a secure and committed funding
source to address those additional costs adequately.292 A federal
commitment to funding tribal capacity, whether for the oversight
and regulation of energy development or the broader exercise of
self-determination, could help alleviate these dire choices.
Similarly, bureaucratic recalcitrance to engage in selfgovernance compacting and to make a broader range of PFSAs
available for such compacting demonstrates the “it’s us or them”
mentality of the federal-tribal trade-off inherent in the zero-sum
approach to Federal Indian energy policy.293 Rather than viewing
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tribes as partners with which to share and enhance the delivery of
trust responsibilities, for example, many federal agencies have
resisted the expansion of self-governance programs as inconsistent
with the historic federal grantor-tribal grantee relationship, which
allows for greater federal control and oversight of tribal activities.294
This ongoing opposition has delayed much-needed amendments to
the self-governance, and related employment training acts,295 and is
consistent with the recent decision by the Department of the Interior
to end its support for a unique approach to tribal management of the
National Bison Range.296
Thus, although the details and scope of Federal Indian
energy policy may be quite different than other federal policies
focused on tribal self-determination and self-governance, the
challenges posed by the zero-sum approach to federal-tribal
relations are endemic to both. The potential to detach Federal Indian
energy policy from that approach by enhancing federal support for
tribal capacity-building and broadening the bases on which the
federal government can negotiate and develop its relationship with
tribes may, therefore, present an opportunity for enhancing the
federal-tribal relationship in these other contexts as well.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The current political climate has drastically raised the stakes
and changed the potential for reform suggested herein. For example,
President Trump’s directives to roll back various environmental and
other regulations in the name of domestic fossil fuel production have
magnified the political divide between environmental protection and
energy development.297 Therefore, it seems likely that efforts to
interests but may be unwilling constrained by bureaucratic, regulatory, or
statutory limitations.
294
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reform Federal Indian energy policy aligning with the broader
political interests of increasing development of fossil fuels will find
traction while environmental concerns, along with tribal cultural,
religious, and conservation issues, are likely to be ignored, if not
targeted.298
Concurrently, while trumpeting the significance of tribal
sovereignty,299 the new administration has also proposed drastic
budget reductions for the federal agencies most directly responsible
for carrying out the trust responsibility to Indian Country.300 These
proposals could be viewed as consistent with the perceived need for
the federal government to get out of tribes’ way to promote energy
and economic development.301 Indeed, Secretary Zinke even went
so far as to suggest that tribes are seeking an “off-ramp” from the
federal trust responsibility,302 a thinly-veiled throwback to the
termination era of the 1950s.303 Thus, while reform of Federal Indian
energy policy may find support at both ends of Pennsylvania
Avenue and in the Department of the Interior, that support comes at
a price and is tied to broader political ideologies separate from (and
irrelevant to) the federal-tribal relationship, which may serve only
to continue the narrow zero-sum approach of present-day Federal
Indian energy policy, if not result in a return of de facto, if not de
jure, termination.304
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Therefore, if the future of Federal Indian energy policy is to
truly serve the interests of all tribes, its reform must take a broader
view than simply freeing tribes from federal oversight and
correspondingly allowing the federal government to reduce its legal,
moral, and fiscal commitments to Indian Country. Divorcing
Federal Indian energy policy from its zero-sum past could open the
doors to a broader re-conception of the federal-tribal relationship
across other realms and allow tribes to truly decide for themselves
how to engage with their federal trustee. Perhaps then the federaltribal relationship could move farther into the twenty-first
century,305 instead of returning to its dismal past.306
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